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Abstract. Since long, the scientific discourse maintains that sound models are a necessary 
requisite to convincing explanations. How to design them so that they suit configurational 
thinking is the question that Amenta and Poulsen first have explicitly put in the 
methodological agenda of Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The article contributes to the 
substantive and to the technical side of the answer. It reasons that the cogency of the starting 
hypothesis requires factors supporting the expectation that, were they jointly given, the 
outcome would certainly obtain; and considers Ostrom’s “action situation” as a fruitful 
framework for guidance in selection. It then addresses the related risk of overly rich models 
by adapting Baumgartner’s difference-making principle for specification tests to be run on 
candidate factors before minimizations. Exercises in replication will show the extent to 
which these criteria provide a useful diagnostics of existing models, and a blueprint for more 
convincing configurational explanations. 
Keywords. Action situation, Configurational models, Explanations, Difference-makers, QCA, 
Validity. 
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Introduction 
Convincing explanations are statements that, in answering to a why question, give the 
impression of being “final” and arouse “in our mind no additional questions” (Boudon 
174). The impression improves when the argument is “compelling” and the claim 
“airtight” that the statement holds “true” (Cook & Campbell 1983; Yin 2000). In the 
scientific discourse, much of this impression has come to depend on the proof of 
evidence, and on the methods to build it. Methods clarify the special shape that evidence 
must display for the statement to hold, and develop protocols to secure that biases have 
been avoided or mitigated while running this test. Sound and suitable starting models 
constitute a necessary requisite of any empirical probation, as faults in their design can 
spoil the gains from a thorough case selection as much as from the proper treatment of 
evidence. 
Unsurprisingly, model design is a demanding operation in any method with explanatory 
aims – even in the more consolidated. Experimental studies expect models to render the 
theoretical hypothesis without slippages, to include all and only those variables that are 
essential to the explanation, to impose the proper functional form to the explanatory 
variables, and to retain their value across settings (Campbell & Stanley 1966). Not all of 
these concerns apply to Qualitative Comparative Analysis – or, at least, apply in the same 
way. QCA accounts for diversity by pinning down minimal invariant combinations of 
conditions. Its solutions hold at the case level, yet have no currency outside the special 
space and time parameters used to select the population under analysis. Functional forms 
are findings rather than starting points. Yet, as Amenta and Poulsen (1994) have 
emphasized first, they can become unintelligible depending on the number and kind of 
conditions included in the truth table, and the algorithm alone can neither warrant that 
inessential elements will be proven irrelevant and dropped, nor that the factors together 
portray a meaningful explanatory hypothesis (De Meur et al. 2009, Marx 2010, 
Baumgartner and Thiem 2015).  
The main question about good model design remains open in QCA. It asks how to build 
models such that the explanatory factors form a credible configurational “whole” and 
yield solutions that are essential to populations. This article contributes to the answer. It 
addresses the puzzle as two distinct yet related issues: first, how to theorize causation so 
that it supports configurational hypotheses; second, how to warrant that hypotheses 
include all and only the essential local specifications. Thus, section 1 drives Amenta and 
Poulsen’s suggestions for building configurational models to their consequence, and 
shows how a single unifying framework such as “action situation” (Ostrom 2005) can 
guide the researcher in selecting factors from different theories and in organizing them 
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into a single meaningful configurational model supporting deterministic expectations 
for QCA analysis. Section 2 addresses the technical question, and builds on the concept of 
“Boolean difference-makers” (Baumgartner 2012) to develop indexes assessing the 
import and essentiality of single conditions in securing sufficient solutions. Section 3 
applies the criteria to known studies, while section 4 draws some provisional conclusions. 
1. Theorizing convincing 
configurational models 
“Where to begin” in QCA is the very pragmatic question that Amenta and Poulsen 
addressed as early as 1994. In their seminal contribution, they note how often starting 
models are directly built upon results from statistical studies, and how this dialogue with 
previous knowledge comes at a cost. Comprehensive truth tables, meant for portraying 
different theories in all their empirical richness, lead to escalating limited diversity and 
to results of unintelligible complexity. Selective truth tables – narrowing on special 
theories, or on statistical determinants – may seem nifty while entrenching 
unamendable biases. Even worse, neither comprehensive nor selective formal 
procedures can secure that truly explanatory configurations have been modeled. This 
doubt is corrosive, as it questions the very possibility of convincing configurational 
explanations. To overcome these faults, they shift the burden on theory, and suggest 
narrowing on those alone that are already “conjunctural or combinatorial in 
construction and that predict multiple causal combinations for one outcome” (Amenta 
and Poulsen 1994:29). The example they provide to illustrate their point is especially 
enlightening.  
In explaining the United States’ welfare programs in the first decades of the last century, 
they indicate institutional politics theory as the prototype of configurational thinking, 
because of its combination of “structural situations and political actors in the 
advancement of public spending policies” (ibid.:32). They select four factors consistent 
with it – the spending ideology of the ruling party; an agency with power on social 
programs; voting rights; and patronage parties – that they hybridize with an element 
from the power resource theory – namely, strong labor movements. The enlightening 
part emerges when the authors justify their model design. To them, voting rights have 
to be included as they channel the demands for spending programs into the policymaking 
system that would otherwise be directed outside, toward charities and other societal 
organizations. The labor movement is added as its presence bolsters the demand. The 
spending ideology of the ruling party matters as much as their members make the 
budget. The consensus strategy of the parties decides whether spending is delivered as a 
4 
 
favor instead of an entitlement. A powerful agency matters because of the interest it has 
in furthering social spending programs.  
These reasons expose a single rationale underlying the selection – the aim to provide a 
consistent causal story to the occurrence of the outcome, where consistency is secured 
by the reference to theoretical assumptions about some underlying generative process. 
Indeed, their model entails that social spending programs are the output of a 
policymaking process, which obtains under condition that those in power back the 
content and those who oppose the content cannot obstruct the process. These implicit 
assumptions allow for special expectations about the contribution of each condition to 
the outcome – and possibly for claims of necessity. In the example, the claim is made for 
voting rights, as the element without which the causal story of public welfare programs 
cannot initiate.  
Amenta and Poulsen’s benchmark then entails that configurational models require a 
framework providing a common ground to different theories of the generation of a same 
outcome. The framework makes a single sense of both the processes leading to the 
outcome and the structures shaping their direction, although only one side of the story is 
modeled. In their example, events remain unobserved. Their analysis neither shows that 
welfare demands gained salience following trade unions’ pressures; nor that societal 
priorities actually imparted a twist to the government agenda; nor that political patrons 
tended to veto redistributive spending and were sidelined, while agencies and pro-
spending deputies allied to foster welfare programs in the budgeting process. Instead, 
their model assumes all these events as implied by the very same occurrence of the 
outcome, and pinpoints instead the conditions under which the right chain of events has 
to materialize. In their rendering, the conditions are key actors’ properties, such as 
power and preferences, all pointing in a same direction. This suggestion chimes with the 
stance that QCA is better geared to account for complex units’ performance by a set of 
their properties arranged in “explanatory typologies” that support special expectations 
about their behavior, rather than by the behavior itself (Berg-Schlosser and Cromqvist 
2005, Elman 2005).  
Underlying frameworks do not have to remain unspoken, however. When looking for an 
explicit schema that can give consistency to configurational models in the social sciences 
across a variety of field theories, the concept of “action situation” (Ostrom 2005) provides 
a fruitful example. As Figure 1 summarizes, the core of the framework assumes that 
outcomes follow from the interplay of the actions that participants choose. Participants 
opt for a special course of action on the basis of the position they hold in the situation, 
the costs and rewards associated to alternatives, as well as of the degree of control and 
information that they have on it. The whole situation, in turn, is shaped by rules – 
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establishing for each position how they can be held and lost, which capacities are 
warranted and which obligations are associated, which alternative courses of action can 
be undertaken, at which special cost and return for both the collective and the position 
holder. As the framework treats shaping rules as external constraints, each action 
situation can be treated as a closed analytic “holon” in which causation clearly flows from 
rules and actors to outcomes, through strategies and actions. As such, it can support and 
organize a variety of substantive hypotheses about the generation of special effects.  
 
Fig.1.  Action situation: elements and constraints 
 
Source: adapted from Ostrom (2005). 
 
From a configurational viewpoint, the framework indicates that, to unfold as expected, 
the “right” actors have to be in the “right” positions and equipped with the “right” 
endowments – as well as put under “right” rules. Configurational hypotheses that 
portray such a “right” situation can therefore maintain that the complete model, if 
observed, would limit the degrees of freedom of the participants to the point of locking 
in their strategy on the outcome. So understood, configurational models can justify a 
stance on the determinism of complete and rightly set conjunctural hypotheses – that is, the 
claim of their sufficiency. 
The unity of an action situation however also suggests that strategy-based, resource-
based, and rule-based substantive theories are not truly alternative explanations. Rather, 
they are alternative analytical entry points on the same generative process – which 
makes them interdependent at best, and clearly dependent according to the ontological 
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assumptions of the framework. This consideration is quite consequential, as it entails 
that a truly complete configurational explanation would surely include all the factors 
required to account for the outcome, but redundantly so. Indeed, being CR the complete 
“right” conjunction of rules, CAP the complete “right” conjunction of the properties that 
special actors get or maintain when in special positions, CB the complete “right” 
conjunction of actors’ strategic behavior, SE the complete and “right” sequence of events, 
Y as the expected outcome, and right-headed arrows as relationships of sufficiency, the 
causal assumptions engrained in an action situation can be summarized as in model 𝓜 
below: 
 
𝓜 CR → CAP → CB → SE → Y 
 
Be the model empirically true, any explanation of Y based on more than one complete 
antecedent would prove redundant to the population at hand, while any complete 
antecedent alone should provide a “locking in” model and sufficient to any consequent 
down to Y. Yet, the relationship between conjunctions is defined by the relationship 
between their elements, as analytically each event required to bring the outcome about 
follows from the right behavior cB stemming from a subset of actors with the right 
properties cAP as shaped by the right and related rules cR. Hence, a minimally sufficient 
causal story of Y can be also modeled with elements from different antecedents – 
provided that they do not operationalize the same chain of sufficiency, i.e., that they 
indicate essential elements alone.  
How to test that a single antecedent or a hybrid model only includes essential elements 
is the question that motivates the next section.  
2. Correcting the model for the population 
The current methodological discourse already recognizes that configurational findings 
can misrepresent causation if factors are included in a solution that are inessential to 
account for the outcome. The point has been especially emphasized by Baumgartner 
(2009, 2012, Baumgartner and Thiem 2015), who has developed a fully alternative 
protocol to QCA for retrieving causal structures with Boolean analysis.  
Coincidence analysis (CNA) assumes determinism as a property not of correct and 
complete hypotheses, but of observed configurations directly. The conjunctions that 
observations associate to an outcome are therefore naturally sufficient to it, and their 
disjunction is necessary. Yet, observed causation may include sub-products or by-
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products of causation, whereas proper ascription can only be to those minimal models 
that preserve necessity and sufficiency as observed. The protocol hence assesses the 
existence of logical dependencies among all the explanatory elements by treating any 
factor as an outcome, then checking for redundancies in the remaining conjunct; and 
identifies redundancies by first dropping a condition from this conjunct, then checking 
that the remaining part is not shared by any configurations with opposite outcome. 
The protocol unfolds from the idea that non-redundant factors are “Boolean difference-
makers”. Strictly connected to counterfactual and contrastive assessments of causation 
(Menzies 2004), difference-making is the property of those factors without which some 
event cannot occur – unless the event is overdetermined. The property is usually proven 
when evidence shows that variations in the factor affects the occurrence of the event. 
The proof is however far from final if the units of analysis are not comparable as twin 
worlds, and unless opportune designs and controls are deployed so as to warrant that the 
detected change in the event can be clearly ascribed to the sole variation in the factor 
(Cook and Campbell *). These requisites are seldom met in the usual Boolean analysis, 
and it seems still debatable whether CNA’s assumptions about the necessity and 
sufficiency of observed configurations can compensate for less demanding designs. 
Moreover, so far the protocol retrieves more alternative “causal structures” than are 
theoretically meaningful – which may undermine the cogency of explanatory arguments 
rather than tightening them.  
The idea of difference-makers can nevertheless prove fruitful within the framework of 
QCA, too, when developed into a test for the essentiality of a theoretical causal factor to 
the population under analysis. As such, it qualifies as a complement to Quine-McCluskey 
minimizations, rather than an alternative – although a needed one. Indeed, Quine-
McCluskey minimizations suit causal assessments of observational data because they 
build on the easier assumption of dissimilarity of the units of analysis. As a consequence, 
in a reversal of standard contrast and counterfactual strategies, they ascribe causation to 
invariance. They consider variation to signal irrelevance, and pinpoint minimal 
explanations by dropping the only different component in otherwise twin configurations 
with same outcome until the least complex set of conjuncts is found that still covers all 
the primitive configurations. However, as CNA scholars point out, in so doing the Quine-
McCluskey only establishes that some factors are relevant to the occurrence of the 
outcome in some subpopulations, not that they are all essential to account for the cases 
at hand. As minimizations treat any conditions as a direct cause to the outcome, 
essentiality is an assumption instead; when untested, it can lay solutions open to the 
suspect of confirmation bias. In the current practice, however, such a test is lacking. The 
only prescribed assessment consists in the so-called “analysis of necessity”, in which the 
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consistency and coverage of necessity is calculated of individual conditions to the 
outcome. Given the symmetric meaning of the parameters, the analysis also displays the 
coverage and consistency of sufficiency, respectively; thus, it yields all the information 
about the kind of set relationship that links each condition to the outcome. Although 
originally envisaged to find and drop those “trivial” necessary conditions which would 
have inflated the results without adding to its explanatory power (Goertz 2006), the 
analysis is now usually meant for acknowledging necessary conditions. The idea of 
difference-makers can fill this gap, and equip QCA with a test for the inessentiality of 
single conditions to explain a population that can guide model building. To serve this 
purpose, however, the difference-making principle has to be adapted to the rationale of 
QCA, i.e., chasing sufficiency.  
In QCA, sufficiency is satisfied when a solution W distributes evidence such that, being y 
the absence of the outcome, intersection Wy is empty (Ragin 2008). Yet, solutions mirror 
the distribution in the truth table – so that the fit is actually decided by models. 
Sufficiency is warranted when models render the starting hypothesis so that no primitive 
configuration in the truth table is “contradictory” – i.e., is observed in instances with 
opposite outcome. Contradictions undermine the claim that solutions are causal, as they 
blur the difference between intentionally explanatory models and intentionally random 
models (Marx 2010). Moreover, they signal a variety of possible design problems – ill-
calibration of the raw variables, choice of ambiguous indicators for theoretical 
constructs, or underspecification of the model itself. The good practice has long 
suggested that minimizations should be run only after contradictions are unraveled, and 
the usual solution to underspecification has always been to add the further factor that is 
substantively consistent with the theory of reference and that tells the positive instances 
out of the negative in the contradictory primitive (Rihoux and De Meur 2009, Schneider 
and Wagemann 2010).  
The good practice hence entails the more general principle that the capacity of 
unraveling contradictions proves that a condition is a difference-maker to the 
population, therefore essential to explain its special diversity; and that ascertained 
difference-making power provides a reason for keeping a condition in the model. The 
principle can be operationalized so as to test those factors that complete configurational 
hypotheses suggest for inclusion, so as to ascertain their essentiality independent of the 
test of relevance by minimizations. As this sorting power may be both absolute, of the 
single condition, and relative to the starting model, the test can require two separate 
indexes. In the following, import refers to the individual capacity of a single condition to 
tell either positive or negative instances out of a non-specified population; essentiality 
instead to whether each condition is required for preserving the non-contradictoriness 
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of a complete starting model. Both are gauged through the cardinality of single property 
sets and intersection. 
As for import, if we let 
- 𝓜 be a model explaining Y with 𝓴 specifying conditions, tested on a population 
𝓟 of 𝓝 instances, 
- X be the 𝓴-th explanatory condition in 𝓜;  
- 𝓶 be a submodel of 𝓜 such that 𝓶 = {X};  
- 𝓹 be the subpopulation of instances observed in non-contradictory primitives 
generated by 𝓶;  
- 𝓷 the cardinality of 𝓹,  
the import of a condition X in 𝓟 is then given by the following ratio: 
import =𝓷 / 𝓝 
The index can take values between 0 and 1. The highest score proves a condition to be 
necessary and sufficient to the outcome, as it orders the population in two non-
contradictory clusters. Just the opposite, its lowest score proves that the condition has 
no sorting power in 𝓟.  
Conditions with no detectable import may nevertheless prove essential to the 
explanatory capacity of the overall model because of their contribution to non-
contradictory truth tables. Essentiality thus complements import with a more conclusive 
information about the capacity of a condition to prevent contradictions in the truth 
table. It can be gauged as the difference in the number of instances in contradictory 
configurations in the full model, and in the same model without that condition. More in 
detail, if again we let 
- 𝓜 be the model explaining Yi with 𝓴 specifying conditions, tested on population 
𝓟 of 𝓝 instances,  
- Xi be the 𝓴-th explanatory condition in 𝓜;  
- 𝓶′ be a submodel of 𝓜 such that 𝓜\𝓶′ = {Xi};  
- 𝓠 be the subpopulation of contradictory instances from 𝓜;  
- 𝓺′ be the subpopulation of contradictory instances from 𝓶′;  
- 𝓺″ be the difference 𝓺′\ 𝓠;  
- 𝓷″ the numerosity of 𝓺″, 
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we have that, when 𝓜 is overspecified, 𝓠 = {Ø}; and if X is inessential, then 𝓺′= 𝓠 and 𝓺″ 
= {Ø}, while if X is essential, then 𝓺′> 𝓠 and 𝓺 ″ ≠ {Ø}. Thus, the essentiality of X can be 
synthesized as: 
essentiality = 𝓷″/𝓝 
Again, the index spans from 1 to 0. As dropping an inessential condition generates no 
new contradictions, when a condition is inessential, 𝓷″ takes the 0-value and the ratio is 
null. As dropping the only necessary and sufficient condition in a model instead turns 
the whole population into a single contradiction, the most essential condition would 
make 𝓷″ = 𝓝 and give the index the full value of 1.  
The meaning of the two indexes becomes clearer when applied to a fictional dataset with 
known solutions A+B  Y, ab  y to which a trivial condition is added to blur results – as 
in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1.  Fictional Dataset (a); and the related truth table(b). 
(a)      (b)        
instances A B C Y  A B C instances Y S-cons y S-cons 
i1 0.2 0.8 1.0 0.9  0 1 1 i1, i2 1 1.00 0 0.40 
i2 0.1 0.7 1.0 0.8  1 0 1 i3, i4 1 1.00 0 0.40 
i3 0.7 0.1 1.0 0.8  1 1 1 i5, i6 1 1.00 0 0.41 
i4 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.9  0 0 1 i7, i8 0 0.53 1 0.81 
i5 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.8  0 1 0      
i6 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.9  1 0 0      
i7 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.1  1 1 0      
i8 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.2  0 0 0      
 
The Standard Analysis of sufficiency with fsQCA retrieves AC + BC as both complex and 
intermediate solutions to Y with a consistency of sufficiency (S-cons for short) equals to 
1.00, and A + B as the parsimonious solution, again with S-cons of 1.000; while it explains 
y with abc as complex solution, and with ab as both the parsimonious and the 
intermediate solution, always with S-cons of 0.81. Import and essentiality should 
ascertain that the trivial condition does not have explanatory power and hence can be 
dropped from the analysis of sufficiency. 
If we calculate the import of each condition as in Table 2.a and Table 2.b, indeed we see 
that both condition A and condition B generate a non-contradictory cluster of 4 instances 
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out of 8, as 𝓹A={i3, i4, i5, i6} while 𝓹B={ i1, i2, i5, i6}. So, importA = importB = 4/8 = 0.5. Table 
2.c makes out clear that condition C has no sorting power instead, as it clusters all the 
instances in a contradictory configuration. Thus, importC = 0/8 = 0.  
 
Table 2. Import of (a) condition A, (b) condition B, and (c) condition C  
on the model as in Table 1. 
(a)     (b)     (c)    
A instances nr Y  B instances nr Y  C instances nr Y 
1 
i3, i4,  
i5, i6 
4 1  1 
i1, i2, 
i5, i6 
 1  1 
i1, i2, i3, i4, 
i5, i6, i7, i8 
8 Cd 
0 
i1, i2,  
i7, i8 
4 Cd  0 
i3, i4,  
i7, i8 
 Cd  0 -  1 
Keys:  “nr” = number of instances in the configuration, “Cd” = contradictory outcome 
 
Essentiality further confirms that C does not really contribute to the model, as its 
dropping does not generate contradictions. We know that 𝓝=8 by design. From Table 
1.b, we learn that 𝓠 = {Ø} and, from Table 3.c, that 𝓺 ′C = {Ø}. Hence, 𝓷″C=0, and 
essentialityC =0/8=0. When instead we consider the model without A, Table 3.a tells us 
that 𝓺′A = 𝓺″A ={i3, i4, i7, i8}, so that 𝓷″A=4 and essentialityA = 4/8 = 0.5. From Table 3.b we 
learn that B gets the same essentiality score, although based on partially different 
elements as 𝓺′B = {i1, i2, i7, i8}. 
 
Table 3. Truth tables obtained by dropping (a) A, (b) B, (c) C from the model in Table 1. 
(a)      (b)      (c)     
B C Inst. nr Y  A C Inst. nr Y  A B Inst. nr Y 
1 1 
i1, i2,  
i5, i6 
4 1  1 1 
i3, i4,  
i5, i6 
4 1  1 1 i5, i6 2 1 
0 1 
i3, i4,  
i7, i8 
4 Cd  0 1 
i1, i2, 
 i7, i8 
4 Cd  1 0 i3, i4 2 1 
1 0     1 0   1  0 1 i1, i2 2 1 
0 0     0 0   0  0 0 i7, i8 2 0 
Keys:  “nr” = number of instances in the configuration, “Cd” = contradictory outcome 
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Import and essentiality here agree on suggesting that the correct model explaining Y 
only requires conditions A and B. Streamlining the model has two main consequences on 
the results: first, given that the truth table is fully specified, the complex, the 
parsimonious, and the intermediate solutions overlap; second, the new solutions 
maintain the same S-cons values as those from the overspecified model.  
Provisional conclusions 
Sound models are necessary to convincing explanations. Yet, the requisites of sound 
models change with the special ontological and epistemological assumptions engrained 
in the method chosen for probation.  
QCA assesses the sufficiency of configurational hypotheses. Suitably sound models are 
those which justify such a determinism in observation. Convincing models portray a 
complete ideal conjunction of conditions that leaves no room for any outcome different 
from the expected one. To overcome the difficulties in configurational model building, 
the point is made that a single encompassing framework can prove useful where macro 
and micro components are kept together and causation is given a direction – as is in 
Ostrom’s action situation. A similar framework also provides a yardstick for improving 
existing models, as it suggests which additional elements could make the hypothesis 
truly compelling. 
Yet, configurational thinking may easily yield overly rich hypotheses with respect to the 
population at hand, raising the question of formal criteria for establishing that a 
condition is required for a sound the explanation. This empirical matter is usually 
understood as the difference-making capacity of a factor to the outcome, and connected 
to variation. This work adapts the concept to the explanatory aim of QCA – that of making 
non-contradictory sense of the diversity in a population for ascribing sufficiency to 
invariant implicants – and operationalizes it as import and essentiality. The two indexes 
provide a further guidance in building complete and essential explanatory models while 
casting new light on the correctness of existing studies. Replications will tell whether 
import and essentiality can yield results as neat as the fictional ones. 
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